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Anjan Thakor
IS THE UNITED STATES 
BANKRUPT?
Kotlikoff scoffs at the use of government debt
or budget deficits as a measure of fiscal solvency
because these measures are highly sensitive to the
labels one attaches to what the government takes
in as revenues and what it pays out to its citizens.
A country can run budget surpluses and have no
debt and yet be broke. The paper therefore suggests
relying on generational accounting to examine the
lifetime fiscal burdens facing current and future
generations. It refers to a study by Gokhale and
Smetters (2005) that calculated the U.S. fiscal gap,
measured as the present value of the difference
between all future government expenditures,
including servicing official debt, and all future
receipts. Gokhale and Smetters (2005) use the
federal government’s definition of receipts and
payments in their calculation, but alternative
definitions would not change the final answer.
According to the authors, the U.S. fiscal gap is
$65.9 trillion. This is an astounding number
because it is more than five times the U.S. gross
domestic product (GDP) and a little less than
twice the size of national wealth. Based on this,
Kotlikoff concludes that the United States is truly
bankrupt.
The contributors to the fiscal gap are the
familiar culprits—Medicare and Medicaid spend-
ing and to a lesser extent Social Security—com-
bined with tax cuts. Kotlikoff considers many of
the potentially counterveiling forces that could
ameliorate the situation, such as immigration
I
n his interesting paper (Kotlikoff, 2006),
Professor Laurence Kotlikoff confronts
the provocative question suggested by
his title. The answer the paper provides
is strongly in the affirmative. And to bring home
the point of what this means, Kotlikoff reminds
us of a paraphrased version of the Oxford English
Dictionary definition of bankruptcy: “at the
end of its resources, exhausted, stripped bare,
destitute, bereft, wanting in property, or wrecked
in consequence of failure to pay its creditors.”
Although he does not do this, he could have
underscored his point further by citing from
Hemingway’s The Sun Also Rises: “‘How did
you go bankrupt?’ ‘Two ways. Slowly, and then
all at once.’” In any event, after making the
case that the United States is bankrupt, the
paper proceeds to examine policy responses
that politicians might be tempted to adopt in
response to the impending bankruptcy, which
are summarily dismissed as economically disas-
trous. The paper ends with a discussion of the
policy responses that Kotlikoff recommends.
Thus, the paper can be viewed as having three
main components: an examination of the rele-
vant macroeconomic data to assess whether the
United States is bankrupt in present value
terms, an assessment of seemingly politically
expedient policy responses that are likely to be
economically devastating, and recommended
policy responses. I will comment on each in
turn.
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       and productivity gains in developing countries
such as India and China. He concludes, based on
Auerbach and Oreopoulos (2000), that the addi-
tional taxes the government collects from immi-
grants barely cover the extra costs they generate
in terms of public goods and services, and thus
immigration is unlikely to be the answer. He is
more optimistic about the role of China, in light
of China’s high savings rate, its national account
surplus, and its eagerness to make larger and
larger direct investments in various parts of the
world. He is critical of the U.S. government’s
recent role in the events that caused the Chinese
National Petroleum Corporation to withdraw its
bid for Unocal, particularly in light of the very
low national savings rate in the United States and
the obvious need for foreign capital to flow into
the United States.
Although the paper makes these points per-
suasively and forcefully, I have three groups of
comments on the underlying analysis: (i) the root
causes of the problem, (ii) the notion of bankruptcy
as applied to the United States and the alternative
view that emerges if we actually take seriously
the analogy of the U.S. fiscal gap with corporate
bankruptcy as understood in corporate finance,
and (iii) the role of the key assumptions in the
analysis.
The Root Causes of the Problem
The basic problem the paper identifies as a
root cause seems hard to deny: As a nation we are
spending too much and saving too little. In par-
ticular, the rampant growth in the government’s
spending on social welfare and entitlement pro-
grams has created a huge gap between what has
been promised to future generations and what can
be afforded. This should, in the usual circum-
stances, lead to an increase in long-term interest
rates to provide the incentives for politicians to
rein things in. In fact, one could argue that the
fiscal improvements in the 1990s had a lot to do
with politicians’ concerns about the reaction of
the bond market to reckless spending.
However, that is not what is happening at
present. Although politicians are talking a lot
about fiscal discipline, they are doing little about
it. The government has recently handed out huge
subsidies to energy producers and promised sev-
eral hundred billion dollars for transport projects.
Yet, long-term interest rates have remained low,
thereby substantially weakening one of the market-
based incentive effects that tends to curb the fiscal
profligacy of politicians. Normally, such low inter-
est rates would imply too much saving relative to
what people want to invest. But we know that the
United States certainly does not have an excessive-
savings problem. Rather, as Ben Bernanke and
others have recognized, it is the increasing flow
of dollar capital from emerging Asian economies
into the United States that has contributed to the
underlying long-term interest rate dynamics in
the United States, and this flow of capital is in
turn driven by demographic and structural shifts
in the global economy.1
Although Kotlikoff’s focus is on the fiscal gap
and his criticism is of the irresponsible behavior
of U.S. politicians over the past 10 to 15 years, it
is nonetheless useful to recognize that this prob-
lem also has roots in the apparent failure of market
forces to discipline these politicians because of
what is happening elsewhere in the world. That
does not make the problem of tackling the fiscal
gap head-on any less important, but it highlights
an aspect of the environment today that is differ-
ent from that of the past.
The Idea of a Bankrupt Nation
In corporate finance, a distinction is made
among three types of financial distress: pre-
bankruptcy financial distress, bankruptcy, and
liquidation. Pre-bankruptcy financial distress
Thakor
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1 The phenomenon of capital being channeled from other parts of
the world into the United States is not a homogenous one, in that
the underlying dynamics differ from country to country. In China,
where the savings rate is a staggering one-third of national income,
there is also high investment and rapid growth, but much of it is
exported rather than used for domestic consumption. The net effect
is a savings surplus that China is investing all over the world
through direct foreign investment and in the United States through
the purchase of dollar-denominated financial assets. In other parts
of the world, it is a lack of investment at home combined with
central bank intervention in the form of purchasing dollars with
local-currency-denominated liabilities for “currency management”
that has generated the flow of capital from these countries into the
United States. Thus, with the exception of China, there appears to
be relatively low investment outside the United States and relatively
high debt-financed consumption combined with very low savings
and possibly unsustainable levels of government spending in the
United States. refers to a situation in which the firm suffers a
shock so that (i) its operating cash flows seem tem-
porarily insufficient to cover its debt repayment
obligations and (ii) access to further credit dries
up as a result of adverse selection, moral hazard,
or other frictions. However, the firm is still an
economically viable business, with potential
access to positive-NPV (net present value) projects
in the future. One outcome in this case is that the
firm renegotiates its contracts with its employees
to lower costs, improve cash flows, and enhance
its debt-service capability. An example of this is
the renegotiation of General Motor’s labor contract
with the United Auto Workers, as well as the many
renegotiations that the airlines have had with their
labor unions. Another outcome—not mutually
exclusive of the first—is that the firm renegotiates
with its creditors to lower its repayment burden
now in exchange for something provided to
creditors in the future. The idea in both cases is
to avoid bankruptcy, which can create deadweight
losses in the form of restrictions on the firm’s
ability to do business as well as direct out-of-
pocket fees for lawyers and accountants. Increas-
ingly, however, the threat of bankruptcy is being
used strategically by firms as a tool to renegotiate
contracts that seem economically unattractive in
light of changes in the environment.
When attempts to renegotiate fail, the threat
point of the renegotiation is reached and formal
bankruptcy proceedings follow. However, even
in such a case, what essentially happens is that
there is a court-mediated renegotiation, and the
firm continues to operate—albeit with some court-
mandated restrictions on things such as asset
disposals, acquisitions, and so on—as it did before.
Creditors may end up taking a “hair cut” in the
form of a reduced repayment by the firm; but even
during bankruptcy proceedings the firm has the
ability to access additional financing for working
capital,2 and it is also judged to have access to
positive-NPV projects in the future. Firms even-
tually emerge from bankruptcy with a set of rene-
gotiated contracts, and life goes on.
The direst form of financial distress is liquida-
tion. Here the business is simply judged to be no
longer economically viable. It cannot operate with-
out additional infusions of capital, and nobody is
willing to put any more capital into it. In other
words, the supply of positive-NPV projects is
exhausted and only negative-NPV projects remain.
The firm’s assets are therefore liquidated. This
must have been the condition of buggy-whip
manufacturers after the automobile was invented.
When Kotlikoff compares the state of the
United States to that of a “bankrupt” firm, it is
not clear which form of financial distress he has
in mind. The reliance on the Oxford English
Dictionary definition of bankruptcy as “exhausted,
stripped bare, destitute, bereft, wanting in prop-
erty” seems closest to liquidation. Yet, one would
be hard-pressed to find someone who believes
this is the state of the U.S. economy. With $35
trillion in national wealth and a growing economy,
the United States could hardly be described as
exhausted, stripped bare, or wanting in property.
Could the U.S. situation be described as analo-
gous to corporate bankruptcy then? Hardly. The
fiscal gap problem identified in this paper is not
one in which the U.S. government owes foreign
creditors more money than it has the ability to
repay, and U.S. Treasury bonds are still viewed
as risk-free securities from a credit-risk stand-
point.3 Moreover, because the U.S. government’s
commitments are in nominal terms, the corporate
form of bankruptcy does not seem even techni-
cally feasible. Rather, the fiscal gap is caused by
the government having made social-safety-net
promises that seem large, relative to its revenue
base. These promises are both explicit, as repre-
sented by Medicare and Medicaid, and implicit,
as represented by unplanned expenditures on
“bailouts” of victims of natural disasters such as
hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes. It is essen-
tially caused by an unsustainable structure of
transfer payments.
The more appropriate way of describing the
U.S. situation is as follows. Suppose we have an
economy that consists solely of a single fruit tree
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2 This financing, which has grown substantially over the past two
decades or so, is called debtor-in-possession financing.
3 In any event, because the dollar is the world’s reserve currency
and U.S. government’s debt obligations are in dollars, the govern-
ment can always repay its dollar-denominated liabilities, even if it
means printing more money and inflating the currency.and two agents. The entire output of the fruit tree
goes to agent A, and he has promised to pay agent B
$3,000 per year for his share of ownership in the
economy. The promise includes a clause that per-
mits agent B to receive more should unanticipated
needs arise. The fruit tree is producing $6,000
worth of fruit per year that agent A is able to sell
externally and share the proceeds equally with
agent B. However, in a couple of years, as a result
of good fortune the fruit tree’s output is worth
$8,000; coincidentally, in those years agent B’s
demand for consumption goes up to $6,500 as a
result of illness, so agent A gives agent B $6,500,
keeping $1,500 for himself. In subsequent years,
the fruit tree’s output drops back to $6,000, but
agent A has promised to pay agent B $6,500 and
the expectation is that this payment will experi-
ence a growth rate of g = 1 percent per year per-
petually. If one uses a discount rate r = 3 percent,
the present value of the shortfall agent A is faced
with is 
This is the analog of the U.S. fiscal gap that
Kotlikoff refers to, and he would call this economy
bankrupt. 
Note, however, that the closest analog of this
in the corporate context is the pre-bankruptcy
financial distress that I discussed earlier. And what
usually happens in that case is precisely what is
likely to happen in the simple economy above.
Clearly, agent A’s promise to agent B is no longer
sustainable and a renegotiation of the promise
will have to occur. This economy is not bereft or
wanting in property. It is producing $6,000 worth
of fruit per year and is just as viable as it was when
agent B was promised $3,000 per year. The econ-
omy simply needs to change its structure of trans-
fer payments.
Similarly, promises made by the U.S. govern-
ment to future Medicare, Medicaid, and Social
Security recipients will have to be renegotiated.
And what will make this politically feasible at
some point is the same set of factors that allows
firms like General Motors to be able to renegotiate
contracts during pre-bankruptcy financial dis-
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other dire economic consequences. In other words,
the United States is not bankrupt. It is a nation
with unsustainable promises to future generations
of citizens that will need to be renegotiated. It is
a bit surprising that Kotlikoff does not focus on
this renegotiation aspect of financial distress,
because doing so leads to very different conclu-
sions from those he reaches.
Would the U.S. government ever renegotiate
its promises or change the rules? Of course, it
would. For example, during the 1980s it became
painfully obvious that the deposit insurance
scheme for savings and loan associations was
deeply flawed and produced perverse risk-taking
incentives. It took the Savings and Loan Crisis and
the implosion of a $3 trillion industry for this to
become a priority for politicians, but eventually
the passage of the Financial Institutions Reform
Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) changed
the rules of the game substantially, including dis-
allowing the inclusion of supervisory goodwill
as regulatory capital.4
The Role of the Key Assumptions in
the Analysis
I will focus on three key assumptions in the
analysis in the paper: the discount rate for calcu-
lating the fiscal gap, the role of the government,
and the role of innovation and technology.
Consider the discount rate first. Given that
spending more than receipts is unsustainable in
the long run, the likelihood of the government
not honoring its social-safety-net promises must
be assessed as increasing through time. This
should increase the discount rate used to compute
the fiscal gap and thus reduce the size of the fiscal
gap. Although I have not performed a sensitivity
analysis of the fiscal gap calculations Kotlikoff
refers to, we do know that present values of per-
petuities are highly sensitive to the discount rate.5
Moreover, when the government does renegotiate
its promises to future generations, the numerator
Thakor
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4 Prior to FIRREA, savings and loans could count supervisory good-
will as regulatory capital and many considered this a government
“promise.”
5 For example, in the illustration I provided earlier, an increase in
the discount rate from 3 percent to 5 percent would cut the present
value of the shortfall in half.in the fiscal gap calculations will also decline,
causing the gap to shrink further.
Let me now turn to the assumed role of the
government in the analysis. As the analysis so
starkly points out, it is the excessively intrusive
role of the government, by means of the huge
social safety net, that is largely responsible for
the fiscal gap. Although the paper does not focus
on this, it is this safety net, combined with the
sophistication of our financial system in making
credit relatively easily available to individuals,
that is significantly responsible for the low and
falling household savings rate in this country. By
contrast, China, which admittedly has a substan-
tial underinvestment in its social safety net, has
households saving at an astonishing 25 percent
of disposable income. Thus, one implication of
the Kotlikoff paper is that part of the solution may
lie in cutting back on the role of the government
and creating stronger incentives for individual
fiscal responsibility.
The impediment to such structural reform,
of course, is that a lot of safety-net expenditures
seem highly desirable ex post and are hence politi-
cally very attractive. But they generate lousy ex
ante incentives, ranging from low household sav-
ings to a persisting desire to build costly infrastruc-
ture and communities in high-risk geographies. 
I now turn to the role of the corporate sector,
which the Kotlikoff paper does not spend much
time discussing. The paper does note that produc-
tivity improvements are unlikely to be enough to
solve the fiscal-gap problem. I want to discuss,
however, the role of innovation and new technolo-
gies. These are unpredictable by their very nature,
but when they do occur they provide discrete
jumps in economic growth and tax revenues, intro-
ducing nonlinearities. These nonlinear patterns
in economic growth seem to be in contrast to
Kotlikoff’s apparent linear extrapolations of his-
torical trends in productivity growth. Moreover,
they also ease resource constraints. In fact, an
important function of a new technology is to relax
a resource constraint or create a resource out of
something that did not exist before.6 But one thing
is clear: Successful innovations will boost invest-
ments and economic growth and could signifi-
cantly affect fiscal gap estimates. In light of my
earlier discussion, the key questions here are also
how future innovations will affect global invest-
ment patterns and hence the flow of foreign savings
into the United States and how these innovations
and possible changes in capital flows will affect
U.S. economic growth and its fiscal gap. Moreover,
foreign direct investments by U.S. companies in
India7 and China will pay increasing dividends
as those economies grow, not only through higher
profit repatriations back to the United States but
also through the innovations these investments
will lead to.8
LIKELY POLICY RESPONSES TO
THE FISCAL-GAP CRISIS
I will be very brief in this section because
the paper devotes little space to this, dismisses
the likely responses as economic suicide, and
moves on.
The most obvious short-term fixes would
appear to be to raise taxes and/or cut government
spending. However, as the paper correctly points
out, this would call for infeasible levels of tax
increases or cuts in discretionary spending. Conse-
quently, Kotlikoff concludes that the most likely
response will be for the government to print more
money. An increase in the money supply will
eventually lead to significant inflation worries
and an increase in interest rates, possibly leading
to spiraling expectations of higher inflation and
then hyperinflation.
I agree with Kotlikoff’s view that none of these
policy responses make much economic sense.
Where I disagree is in his assessment that hyper-
inflation is likely to follow. I think the govern-
ment’s other promises are much more likely to be
renegotiated before we get to that state.
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6 For example, land was not a resource to hunter-gatherers before
the advent of the technology of farming; it’s what they could hunt
and gather from the land that was a resource. Similarly, sand was
hardly a resource before silicon chips. 
7 Currently, the annual flow of foreign direct investments in India
is only about 10 percent of that in China, but this number will
almost surely grow.
8 For example, General Electric’s engineering research center in
India generates more patents every year than any other General
Electric research center. REFORM PROPOSALS
The paper focuses on reforming three parts
of our economic system to address the fiscal-gap
problem: tax reform, social security reform, and
healthcare reform.
On tax reform, Kotlikoff proposes eliminating
all income taxes, the payroll tax, and the estate
and gift tax and replacing them with a simple
federal retail sales tax (or value added tax [VAT])
with a rebate. The sales tax would be levied on
all final consumption goods and services and is
estimated to be 33 percent to cover all of the
government’s expenses.
At first blush, one may wonder why it makes
any difference at all whether the tax imposed on
us is called a sales tax or an income tax, as long
as the aggregate amount of tax paid remains
unchanged. The reasons why the VAT proposal
differs from the current system are twofold.
First, it is obviously a much simpler system,
which is attractive. Second, and more importantly,
it fundamentally changes the nature of intergen-
erational transfers. The current system taxes
those who are earning and saving. According to
Kotlikoff, these tend to be the young. Kotlikoff’s
proposed system would tax those who are con-
suming out of previous savings, that is, those
who are dissaving. Thus, his proposal shifts the
tax burden from the young earners to the old
consumers.
I like this proposal. It is a much better system
from the standpoint of the incentives to save and
consume. I have just two thoughts on this. One
is whether the 33 percent VAT is too high and
whether such tax reform should also be combined
with a fundamental rethinking of the role of the
government and the extent of its safety nets.
Second, I wonder if a VAT-based system may make
it easier for politicians to raise taxes over time.
Anecdotal evidence from Europe suggests that it
is often politically more expedient for politicians
to push through tax increases with a VAT-based
system.
On social security, Kotlikoff proposes scrap-
ping the retirement portion of the current Social
Security system at the margin by paying in the
future only those retirement benefits that were
accrued at the time of the reform. Current retirees
would be grandfathered in and would therefore
receive their full benefits, but current workers
would receive benefits based only on their cov-
ered wages prior to the date of the reform. Indi-
vidual accounts (a Personal Security System [PSS])
would replace the existing retirement system,
with all workers contributing 7.15 percent of their
wages into an individual PSS account. The govern-
ment would contribute to the accounts of the
unemployed and disabled and make matching
contributions on a progressive basis to workers’
accounts. The government would also guarantee
a zero minimum nominal return from investing
the PSS accounts in a global portfolio.
I like most aspects of this proposal too. It is a
definite improvement over the current system, but
then almost anything would be. However, I would
want to go further in reforming the system. We
know that the Social Security system generates
poor savings incentives for individuals and also
creates massive contingent liabilities for the
government. In light of this, my main questions
are these: Why do we need PSS accounts for every-
body? Why do the relatively wealthy need PSS
accounts with a return floor guaranteed by the U.S.
government? Why not limit these accounts to the
bottom 10 or 20 percent of the economic ladder?
I now turn to healthcare reform. Here Kotlikoff
proposes reforming not only Medicare and
Medicaid but also our private health insurance
system. Basically, the proposed system would
replace the current fee-for-service Medicare and
Medicaid programs with a universal health insur-
ance system called the Medical Security System
that would provide individuals with needs-
dependent vouchers to purchase health insurance
each year. The government would have complete
access to everybody’s medical records and would
assess how much health insurance a person needs,
so that the sicker would get bigger vouchers than
the healthier.
Again, the current system is such a mess that
it is hard not to like the Kotlikoff proposal. My
concerns here are threefold. First, there is an obvi-
ous concern with complete government access
to everybody’s medical records, even though
Kotlikoff brushes this issue aside. Second, what
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provide the benefits needed to cover someone
with a particular voucher? That is, the size of the
voucher communicates information about the
person’s health problems, but the market fails to
clear in the sense that no insurance company is
willing to provide the appropriate coverage at that
price. We have examples of rationing in credit
markets due to informational frictions, so this
deserves some thought. Third, the quality of
healthcare in countries where universal health-
care is provided is not very good. Canada is an
example of this. While well over half of all U.S.
doctors are specialists, the Canadian percentage
is much lower, which means that there are far
longer waiting lines for specialists in Canada.
The point is that changing the system has far-
reaching consequences, particularly supply-
side effects induced by the career choices of
individuals in the medical services industry,
that one would want to think about.
CONCLUSION
This is a nifty and thought-provoking paper.
Although I do not agree with the implicit assertion
that the U.S. fiscal gap puts the country in the
same position as a bereft and destitute firm that
is bankrupt and on the verge of liquidation, I do
agree that the current state of affairs is alarming
and the problem needs to be tackled head-on
sooner rather than later. I also would like to see
how the fiscal gap calculation would be affected
by alternative discount rate assumptions, but I
doubt that different numbers would change the
qualitative nature of the conclusions or the appro-
priateness of reform proposals. Moreover, it is
worth thinking about the intertemporal stability
of fiscal gap estimates. I recall it was not that long
ago that politicians in Washington were fretting
over how to spend the surplus!
At its very core, this paper makes a powerful
case that the existing promises by the government,
both explicit and implicit, are simply not tenable
going forward. My belief is that the fiscal crisis
identified by this paper will become so painful
at some point that the political will to renegotiate
these extravagant promises and diminish the
nation’s contingent liabilities is likely to emerge.
But even if that happens, the three areas for reform
that this paper has identified are sorely in need
of critical examination. The proposals this paper
has identified, while not immune to criticisms, are
excellent places to start. I hope those in a position
to do something will heed the unmistakable
warning in this paper.
REFERENCES
Kotlikoff, Laurence J. “Is the United States Bankrupt?”
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, July/
August 2006, 88(4), pp. 235-49.
Auerbach, Alan and Oreopoulos, Philip. “The Fiscal
Effects of U.S. Immigration: A Generational
Accounting Perspective,” in James Poterba, ed.,
Tax Policy and the Economy. Volume 14. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 2000, pp. 123-56.
Gokhale, Jagadeesh and Smetters, Kent. “Measuring
Social Security’s Financial Problems.” NBER
Working Paper No. 11060, National Bureau of
Economic Research, January 2005.
Thakor
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW JULY/AUGUST 2006 257258 JULY/AUGUST 2006 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW